Battalion, 47th Infantry, and to deploy the company by helicopter south of the
reported enemy location. Colonel Tutwiler moved Company C at 1105 by air south of the reported enemy location with the mission of moving northeast to reconnoiter the enemy position.
By 1150 Company C of the 3rd Battalion had swept the reported enemy location without
finding the Viet Cong. Company C of the 4th Battalion was moving west from it's landing area when it was fired upon from the north.
At the same time Company A of the 4th Battalion, moving south but at a distance of some 800 meters north of Company C, 4th Battalion, encountered heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from its front and right flank. The enemy position turned out to be north of the reported location. Company A, lacking cover, suffered heavy casualties. The Viet Cong had occupied well-fortified firing positions in an L-shape along the north bank of the stream that
separated Company A from both Company C of the 3rd Battalion and Company C of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry. Colonel Tutwiler shifted Company B of his battalion, which had been moving on the battalion
right flank, into the area behind Company A to assist by fire and with medical evacuation. He held his Company C on the south side of the stream to maintain contact and manuerved Company C, 3rd Battalion,
north across the stream. Once on the north bank, Company C, 3rd Battalion, fought slowly to the east, with its right flank on the stream.
Major H. Glenn Penny, executive officer and acting commander of the 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry, meanwhile moved his Companies A and B southeast to link up with Company C of the 3rd Battalion on that company's north flank. At 1545 Major Penny resumed operational control of his Company C. Company B attacked east on line with Company C while Company A moved into a blocking position 600 meters north of the left flank of Company B. By 2000 darkness and enemy fire prompted a halt to manuevers and placed Companies B and C, 3rd Battalion, some 600 meters west of Company C of the 4th Battalion where the units remained throughout the night of 19-20 June.
In the movement of the two U.S. battalions toward the first reported enemy location,
the naval assualt craft were limited to movement on the stream paralleling the 4th Battalion's left flank. When Company C of the 4th Battalion was fired upon at 1150, the naval assualt craft that had
brought in the company provided fire support for it and, later, for Company C of the 3rd Battalion as it crossed the stream west of the actual enemy positions.
Although the rifle Companies and the naval assualt craft quickly returned the enemy
fire, artillary and helicopter gunship fire could not be immediately brought to bear because the heavy casualties initially suffered by Company A of the 4th Battalion prevented the company commander from
determining the dispositions of his platoons.
Artillary fire began at approximately 1200; it was delivered at the request of the forward observers and coordinated by both ground and airborne artillary observers. Support was provided during the daylight hours and well into the night by helicopter gunships, medical evacuation helicopters, and assualt craft.
The movement of Companies A, B, and C, 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry, required the
entire afternoon, but not all companies were able to link up before dark. The 2nd Battalion, 46th Infantry, Viet Nam Army, remained in its original position during the engagement because Colonel Fulton
decided that manuever of the battalion to the east would be complicated by the presence of U.S. companies between the Viet Nam battalion and the enemy.
Viet Cong and U.S. troops exchanged fire throughout the daylight hours and into the
U.S. troops found that the enemy's reinforced bunkers could be destroyed only by 90-mm. recoiless rifle fireand helicopter rockets and bombs; the 20-mm. and 80-mm. rounds fired by the assualt craft penetrated a bunker only after multiple hits.
Casualties of Company C of the 3rd Battalion were evacuated during the afternoon and
evening of the battle by plastic assualt boat and helicopter.
Company C of the 4th Battalion was unable to use the assualt craft for medical evacuation and relied on helicopters. Whether casualties were taken directly by helicopter from a ground pickup zone or from an armored troop carrier aid station after treatment, they were sent either to the barracks ship USS Colleton or to a field hospital. During the afternoon and evening of 19 June most of the enemy losses came from U.S. supporting fire concentrated on a small area. A portion of the enemy battalion eluded the U.S. blocking positions during the night, probably by crossing the stream west of Company C, 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry, and then moving south. On 20 June the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry, searched south to make contact with the enemy. Moving by helicopter and on foot the battalion found the enemy north of the Rach Gion Ong stream at Ap Nam and, aided by a company of the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, encircled and eliminated an enemy platoon.